Camp David summit and message to skeptics

By Choo Jae-woo

The public must have experienced something unusual while watching the trilateral summit between South Korea, the United States and Japan on Aug. 18 at Camp David, the retreat of the U.S. president. This is so that they could watch Korea's transformation. When the United States and Japan were secretly engaged more than 120 years ago, Korea was annexed to Japan. The so-called "Taft-Katsura secret treaty" served as a justification for the annexation and Korea quickly lost its sovereignty. Korea was sacrificed in the struggle of great powers against imperial Russia whose expansion they wanted to stop.

However, the summit revealed Korea's altered status and reputation to the world. It is impossible not to boast of it as a historical moment that opened up a new chapter in Korea's diplomatic history. This is due to the fact that Korea has been resurrected as an essential partner nation that stands shoulder to shoulder with the United States and Japan in responding to common threats rather than serving as a scapegoat.

There is no disagreement over the fact that the summit has opened a new horizon for the relationship between South Korea, the U.S. and Japan. The key is now to continue and maintain what has been agreed in the future. Some skeptics are concerned about the feasibility. Just in case Donald Trump is elected as president again in 2024, they worry the outcomes of the Korea-U.S.-Japan summit will all become futile. Moreover, the possible earlier exit from power by the incumbent leaders Joe Biden, Fumio Kishida and Yoon Suk Yeol may give rise to such concerns.

Given past experience, however, communication channels at high and working levels will continue regardless of the leadership changes. The so-called "2 plus 2 dialogue" at the defense and foreign affairs ministries has prevailed for decades. For this precedent, so will the newly agreed annual meetings by the national security advisers, and ministers of commerce, industry and finance respectively flourish in the future.

Also intriguing is the new dialogue forum the leaders of the three nations have established. These channels of communication, which were scheduled to take place yearly, were set up in accordance with the challenges the three nations were confronting. At the Indo-Pacific Dialogue, the three countries agreed to coordinate and cooperate to implement the strategy's major tasks. These tasks include dealing with the threat of disinformation, the shady use of foreign information and the exploitation of surveillance technology. To further the coordination and cooperation of development policies, a new dialogue was launched ― the Trilateral Development Policy Dialogue. Its inaugural meeting was scheduled for this October.

The most notable part of the results of the trilateral summit for Korea's strategic interests was information sharing. Information sharing is a prerequisite for the success of all cooperation. Without fulfilling it, cooperation or policy coordination would be hard to come by. Countries must have high confidence and trust in each other to feel comfortable sharing information that is sensitive to their respective interests. It is in this vein we can see the level of confidence and trust that the U.S. and Japan have in Korea.

Other skeptical concerns in Korea were raised against possible punitive measures from China for Korea's joining of the U.S. and Japan to strengthen trilateral cooperation. It would be difficult for China to follow such a suit as they did in 2016 by adopting sanction measures against Korea when it decided to join the U.S. decision to deploy THAAD. The Chinese economy is in shambles and such decisions would only backfire should it decide to sanction Korea while it is in the middle of strengthening a trilateral relationship.

Another reason is the changes in the structure and nature of the Korea-China economic relations. Korea, as one of the ten largest economies in the world must overcome its obsession that the trade surplus with China will perpetuate. The reality speaks otherwise. None of the top ten economies ― except Japan ― records a trade surplus with China. The Korean public must accept the reality that our trade balance with China is turning into a deficit, and it will continue as Korea must rely on cheaper goods from China for its consumption.

Also, the U.S., South Korea and Japan were ranked first, second and third in terms of total trade with China in 2022. In terms of direct investment (FDI) to China, South Korea, Japan and the United States ranked first, second, and third as of 2021, except for areas with unclear investment sources such as Hong Kong, Singapore and the Virgin Islands. For this reason, the reality is that the more these countries strengthen their cooperation, the less China can take retaliatory or unfriendly measures.

Korea's strengthening of relations with the U.S. and Japan is less likely to translate into a loss of the Chinese market. The U.S. and Japan also depend heavily on the Chinese market. It appears to be a self-evident result that if we join the U.S. camp at a time when they have severed economic relations with China, we will lose the Chinese market. However, it may not be so. Those concerned about losing the Chinese market need to recall one fact, i.e., the purpose of the U.S.-led strategy to keep China in check. The U.S. strategy is aimed at correcting China's unfair and illegal economic behaviors. This means that once China accepts this, everything will be normalized. It must be acknowledged that China's correction of economic behavior also best serves Korea's national interest. Until then, we should put aside concerns about losing the Chinese market for a while. On a grand scale, it is time to show the wisdom of giving bipartisan and pan-national support to the Indo-Pacific strategy and subsidiary measures pursued by the Korean government.

Choo Jae-woo (jwc@khu.ac.kr) is a professor of international relations at Kyung Hee University and director of the China Center at the Korea Research Institute for National Security. He was a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution.