Why Kim-Putin summit could be game-changing

By Andrew Hammond

The Kremlin confirmed Monday that preparations have been concluded for the historic first summit between Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.

With media reporting the meeting could start as soon as Wednesday, a key question is whether Russia can help unlock the stalled nuclear talks between Washington and Pyongyang.

Following the collapse of the Donald Trump-Kim summit in Vietnam in February, this looks a big ask. In Hanoi, there were clear and significant differences between the two sides over the scope and pace of denuclearization and sanctions rollback, with growing uncertainty now whether the talks process will collapse or continue.

And it is into this potential negotiating "black hole" that Putin is now treading, in a context in which Pyongyang last Thursday test-fired a new "tactical guided weapon" with a "powerful warhead." This is the first such test since the Trump-Kim talks process started.

To be sure, there are historical precedents for such high-profile negotiations to fall down, and then recover, including the U.S.-Soviet negotiations between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in 1986 and 1987.

However, it appears the gaps between Trump and Kim remain substantial, and the North Koreans have asserted post-Vietnam that they will not change their position, and also disputed Trump's account that the reason the talks collapsed was that Pyongyang asked for full sanctions rollback.

One of the key reasons Putin may find it hard to move Pyongyang far or fast on its positions is that, to date at least, it is Kim ― rather than Trump ― who has emerged as the bigger winner from the engagement process. So far the young leader has made few concrete concessions to the United States.

At the same time, the U.S. president has already given a significant amount away such as calling off joint military exercises between U.S. and South Korean forces; exchanging effusive letters of praise with Kim; and holding out the prospect of an easing of sanctions on Pyongyang if it does "something meaningful" on denuclearization.

This underlines how much Kim has already received from Trump in exchange for the ambiguous pledges in the Singapore agreement. And this in a context too where there is also reported evidence that North Korea is continuing uranium enrichment and has stepped up missile production.

On a personal level, for instance, the previously isolated young leader has assumed significantly higher profile on the international stage. This was highlighted in Kim's multi-day tour of Vietnam, his fourth foreign trip destination in less than 12 months after not leaving his nation's borders for more than six years after assuming power.

In this context, a key question is why Putin wants to get involved and thinks he can make a difference. The simple answer is that he recognizes the flux in the geopolitical chessboard with significant new opportunities possibly opening up.

While China has played a key role in facilitating this process, Russia also perceives itself to have major interests in the peninsula. It and several other major powers with a stake in the future of the area, including Japan, have therefore all been jockeying for position.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met Kim last year in Pyongyang, and South Korean President Moon also met with Putin last June in Moscow. The latter was the first state visit by a sitting South Korean president to Russia since 1999.

Putin's session with Moon underlines Russia's interests in the historic change that could now be "in the air" on the Korean Peninsula. For instance, Moon is promoting a "New Northern Policy" which, alongside peace talks with Kim, is a key foreign relations policy driver under which his administration is seeking to improve ties with key Eurasian neighbors.

As part of these discussions to strengthen bilateral cooperation, the two leaders explored potential options that may come from the decision of Kim and Moon to link roads and railways along the western and eastern corridors of the Korean Peninsula. In coming years, these transport networks would be extended to China and Russia opening up new opportunities into these frontiers.

It is in this context that Putin will endeavor to coax Kim back to the negotiating table, albeit on terms that favor Moscow's interests as much as possible. Russia knows that the security problems on the peninsula have no easy resolution, and both grappled in 2017 with how best to respond to the regular missile launches by Pyongyang and also its nuclear tests.

Previously, both Moscow and Beijing had been very concerned that the tensions on the peninsular could spiral out of control with the ever mercurial Trump, and had indicated support for a U.N. Security Council initiative. That U.N. measure would have required the United States and South Korea to halt military drills, as Trump has now committed to post-Singapore summit, and also the deployment of the controversial Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system.

Taken overall, the Putin-Kim summit and the wider grand diplomacy on the peninsula underline that the geopolitical tectonic plates are still moving in the peninsula, despite the Vietnam summit collapse.

With historic change potentially in the air, Putin is keen to steer this in a pro-Russia direction, and avoid the downside risks that might happen if the South-North dialogue ultimately proves a mirage, with the warming of relationships going into reverse.

Andrew Hammond (andrewkorea@outlook.com) is an associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics.