Dear Sir,
I would like to take issue with Henry Seggerman's article, "A historical context for ISIS" (Korea Times, April 9, 2015). While there are some interesting points in his opinion piece that deserve debate, he has got his basic facts wrong on Syrian history. He alleges that the French colonizers of Syria "exercised control by installing the 15 percent minority Alawis as the ruling class." He further claims that "after independence, the Assads and their Alawite clique continued oppressing Syria's Sunni majority."
From the point of view of historical accuracy, there is too much wrong here to let it go unchallenged. First, while it is true that the French recruited Alawites into the local armed forces, this was in no way different from the general British and French practice to link up with minorities in colonized societies to use them to control the majority. In this context, recruitment of Alawites was possible because they formed one of the poorest and most oppressed groups in colonized Syria. In addition, they lived in a region of the country — close to the Mediterranean coast — that was of particular strategic significance for French control. Thus, colonial recruitment did not make the Alawites a "ruling class." To the extent that colonized Syria had any ruling class, it was the urban Sunni bourgeoisie in the large cities. This social group was also mostly in charge of the country for the first two decades after independence in 1946. In the meantime, the Alawites continued to gain influence in the armed forces of independent Syria and achieved dominance in the mid-1960s. Yet they did so by forming coalitions with other minorities, such as Christians and Druze, and also included many Sunnis in the ruling group.
Second, although Alawites have been highly influential in Syria during the time of Hafiz al-Assad (1970-2000) and until the present, it is still wrong to claim that they form a "ruling class." Many Alawites never enjoyed personal advantages from how Syria is governed.
Third, the conflict in Syria since March 2011 is complex and the media has generally done a poor job in explaining how local Syrian factors such as social class, sect, and ethnicity, and geopolitical interventions by outside powers have jointly escalated the situation. The claim that Sunni majority rule could solve the issue of Islamist insurgency in Syria is simple-minded and will not help to end the conflict. Syria needs inclusive coalition government to recover from the current turmoil. Any viable solution must be based on power sharing and protection of all minorities rather than majority rule.
I would like to take issue with Henry Seggerman's article, "A historical context for ISIS" (Korea Times, April 9, 2015). While there are some interesting points in his opinion piece that deserve debate, he has got his basic facts wrong on Syrian history. He alleges that the French colonizers of Syria "exercised control by installing the 15 percent minority Alawis as the ruling class." He further claims that "after independence, the Assads and their Alawite clique continued oppressing Syria's Sunni majority."
From the point of view of historical accuracy, there is too much wrong here to let it go unchallenged. First, while it is true that the French recruited Alawites into the local armed forces, this was in no way different from the general British and French practice to link up with minorities in colonized societies to use them to control the majority. In this context, recruitment of Alawites was possible because they formed one of the poorest and most oppressed groups in colonized Syria. In addition, they lived in a region of the country — close to the Mediterranean coast — that was of particular strategic significance for French control. Thus, colonial recruitment did not make the Alawites a "ruling class." To the extent that colonized Syria had any ruling class, it was the urban Sunni bourgeoisie in the large cities. This social group was also mostly in charge of the country for the first two decades after independence in 1946. In the meantime, the Alawites continued to gain influence in the armed forces of independent Syria and achieved dominance in the mid-1960s. Yet they did so by forming coalitions with other minorities, such as Christians and Druze, and also included many Sunnis in the ruling group.
Second, although Alawites have been highly influential in Syria during the time of Hafiz al-Assad (1970-2000) and until the present, it is still wrong to claim that they form a "ruling class." Many Alawites never enjoyed personal advantages from how Syria is governed.
Third, the conflict in Syria since March 2011 is complex and the media has generally done a poor job in explaining how local Syrian factors such as social class, sect, and ethnicity, and geopolitical interventions by outside powers have jointly escalated the situation. The claim that Sunni majority rule could solve the issue of Islamist insurgency in Syria is simple-minded and will not help to end the conflict. Syria needs inclusive coalition government to recover from the current turmoil. Any viable solution must be based on power sharing and protection of all minorities rather than majority rule.
Jörg Michael Dostal
Associate Professor
Graduate School of Public Administration
Seoul National University
![[INTERVIEW] Virtual K-pop group MAVE: is more than just pretty pixels](https://img.koreatimes.co.kr/upload/thumbnailV2/bcc387606cf7451c94f51a5978960c9f.jpg/dims/resize/178/optimize)
![[INTERVIEW] Seoul's increased art market momentum brings Sotheby's back to Korea](https://img.koreatimes.co.kr/upload/thumbnailV2/3439cc1e2d744b85ab81fdcf6f045ba5.jpg/dims/resize/178/optimize)
![[INTERVIEW] 'Cobweb' director questions meaning of cinema](https://img.koreatimes.co.kr/upload/thumbnailV2/a029c9ea411f4aef94c6310f6a7c3c54.jpg/dims/resize/178/optimize)
