By Troy Stangarone
Changes in foreign affairs can seem to happen suddenly at times. Few would have imagined in July 1971 that Richard Nixon would announce he planned to visit China the following year. The announcement earlier this August that Israel and the United Arab Emirates would normalize relations also caught observers by surprise. With Donald Trump suggesting that he could strike a deal quickly with Kim Jong-un if he is re-elected, could a similar surprise with North Korea occur before or after the U.S. presidential election in November?
In reality, neither the opening of U.S. relations with China that followed Nixon's 1972 visit nor the establishment of normal diplomatic relations between the UAE and Israel were as sudden as either seemed publicly.
In the case of China, Washington and Beijing had gone a quarter century without formal relations and there were no signs that significant change was imminent. But changing the relationship was a priority for Nixon who began working from the beginning of his first term as president to establish a channel of communication with Beijing. Nixon was also able to work with Pakistan, which was friendly with both governments, to help to facilitate discussions and Henry Kissinger's trip to China in July 1971 to finalize details of a presidential visit.
Opening relations with China was about changing geostrategic calculus. Normalizing relations with China gave the United States more flexibility in international relations, while also helping it to gain leverage in its relations with the Soviet Union. With Nixon looking to end the Vietnam War, it also gave the United States a new means to pressure Hanoi into taking peace talks seriously.
The recent accord between the UAE and Israel is perhaps the Trump administration's one true foreign policy success. Israel's decision not to immediately move forward with the annexation of territory in the West Bank, something the UAE Ambassador to the United States, Yousef Al Otaiba, had signaled in an op-ed in the Israeli press as a prerequisite for normalizing relations, created the political space for the Trump administration to help the two governments reach agreement. But other factors likely played a larger role in the decisions of both governments.
While Israel has formal relations with Egypt and Jordan from prior peace initiatives, the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians had precluded the development of formal relations with other Arab states prior to the UAE's decision despite quiet diplomacy and cooperation. When Benjamin Netanyahu returned to power in 2009 he made turning what had been quiet diplomacy and cooperation into normal diplomatic relations a priority.
For the Arab states in the region, such as the UAE, the dynamics had begun to change in recent years. The protests during the Arab Spring over corruption and the lack of economic opportunities showed Arab leaders that their populations' domestic grievances were a greater threat to their security than any lingering concerns that those populations may have with Israel.
The United States' support for populations protesting against their governments also ended any belief that Washington would stand with authoritarian governments against their populations, while the Iran nuclear deal pushed the two sides further apart.
Governments in the Middle East, however, have found that they share a strategic interest with Israel in regards to Iran. Both oppose Iran's efforts to develop a nuclear weapon, while sharing concerns about Hezbollah and other proxy forces that Iran supports within the region. Quietly cooperation on national security began to grow between Israel and the states in the region.
In the case of the UAE, Israel took a series of small steps, including offering to lobby for the International Renewable Energy Agency to be headquartered in the UAE. These efforts, however, were conditioned on the premise that Israel's delegates to the new agency be fully accredited, something that happened in 2015.
The process was also helped by the fact that Israel and the UAE have never fought a war. Instead their quarrel was built on the foundations of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.
Nixon's approach to China and the ability of Israel and the UAE to find a way to normalize relations suggest that a surprise announcement with North Korea in the near future is unlikely.
Trump broke with standard practice by meeting Kim Jong-un in Singapore and announced an end to major military exercises with South Korea, so he has demonstrated a willingness to take risks. But the regional dynamics in Northeast Asia have not changed the security calculus of the United States and North Korea to bring them together as they have for Israel and the UAE, or for China and the United States in the 1970s. Nor has there been the type of quiet, incremental cooperation over a period of years that could build trust. These factors are unlikely to change in the near future.
Troy Stangarone (ts@keia.org) is the senior director of congressional affairs and trade at the Korea Economic Institute.
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In reality, neither the opening of U.S. relations with China that followed Nixon's 1972 visit nor the establishment of normal diplomatic relations between the UAE and Israel were as sudden as either seemed publicly.
In the case of China, Washington and Beijing had gone a quarter century without formal relations and there were no signs that significant change was imminent. But changing the relationship was a priority for Nixon who began working from the beginning of his first term as president to establish a channel of communication with Beijing. Nixon was also able to work with Pakistan, which was friendly with both governments, to help to facilitate discussions and Henry Kissinger's trip to China in July 1971 to finalize details of a presidential visit.
Opening relations with China was about changing geostrategic calculus. Normalizing relations with China gave the United States more flexibility in international relations, while also helping it to gain leverage in its relations with the Soviet Union. With Nixon looking to end the Vietnam War, it also gave the United States a new means to pressure Hanoi into taking peace talks seriously.
The recent accord between the UAE and Israel is perhaps the Trump administration's one true foreign policy success. Israel's decision not to immediately move forward with the annexation of territory in the West Bank, something the UAE Ambassador to the United States, Yousef Al Otaiba, had signaled in an op-ed in the Israeli press as a prerequisite for normalizing relations, created the political space for the Trump administration to help the two governments reach agreement. But other factors likely played a larger role in the decisions of both governments.
While Israel has formal relations with Egypt and Jordan from prior peace initiatives, the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians had precluded the development of formal relations with other Arab states prior to the UAE's decision despite quiet diplomacy and cooperation. When Benjamin Netanyahu returned to power in 2009 he made turning what had been quiet diplomacy and cooperation into normal diplomatic relations a priority.
For the Arab states in the region, such as the UAE, the dynamics had begun to change in recent years. The protests during the Arab Spring over corruption and the lack of economic opportunities showed Arab leaders that their populations' domestic grievances were a greater threat to their security than any lingering concerns that those populations may have with Israel.
The United States' support for populations protesting against their governments also ended any belief that Washington would stand with authoritarian governments against their populations, while the Iran nuclear deal pushed the two sides further apart.
Governments in the Middle East, however, have found that they share a strategic interest with Israel in regards to Iran. Both oppose Iran's efforts to develop a nuclear weapon, while sharing concerns about Hezbollah and other proxy forces that Iran supports within the region. Quietly cooperation on national security began to grow between Israel and the states in the region.
In the case of the UAE, Israel took a series of small steps, including offering to lobby for the International Renewable Energy Agency to be headquartered in the UAE. These efforts, however, were conditioned on the premise that Israel's delegates to the new agency be fully accredited, something that happened in 2015.
The process was also helped by the fact that Israel and the UAE have never fought a war. Instead their quarrel was built on the foundations of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.
Nixon's approach to China and the ability of Israel and the UAE to find a way to normalize relations suggest that a surprise announcement with North Korea in the near future is unlikely.
Trump broke with standard practice by meeting Kim Jong-un in Singapore and announced an end to major military exercises with South Korea, so he has demonstrated a willingness to take risks. But the regional dynamics in Northeast Asia have not changed the security calculus of the United States and North Korea to bring them together as they have for Israel and the UAE, or for China and the United States in the 1970s. Nor has there been the type of quiet, incremental cooperation over a period of years that could build trust. These factors are unlikely to change in the near future.
Troy Stangarone (ts@keia.org) is the senior director of congressional affairs and trade at the Korea Economic Institute.
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