By John Burton
U.S. President Joe Biden's upcoming meeting with President Yoon Suk-yeol, scheduled for May 21, will test the hopes of the foreign policy establishment in Washington that Korea's new president is willing to align his country more closely with America.
The election of Yoon was generally greeted warmly in Washington since he appears to check all the boxes when it comes to U.S. foreign policy goals. Unlike his predecessor Moon Jae-in, Yoon has taken a more hawkish response to North Korea's escalating missile and nuclear threats as he pledges to implement a "stronger deterrence." He has also signaled that he could support American efforts to contain China.
Yoon's administration is making much of the fact that it will be the earliest-ever summit between Seoul and Washington into the term of a new Korean president, only 11 days after Yoon's inauguration. Another perceived bonus point is that Biden is visiting Korea before Japan.
But Washington officials appear to have overlooked the fact that Yoon is already unpopular even before he took office. That could matter if the new president decides to carry out controversial policies such as accepting more U.S. THAAD anti-missile batteries or even the re-entry of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on Korean soil. Moreover, Yoon must deal with the fact that there has been broad public support for continued engagement with North Korea that was forged by President Moon.
Yoon has suggested that he would "positively review" joining the so-called Quad alliance of the U.S., Japan, India and Australia, which is viewed as an informal bloc against Beijing, despite the fact that China is Korea's largest trading partner.
The proposal that Korea should play an increased security role in America's Indo-Pacific strategy threatens to divide the public and might backfire for Washington. Public perceptions that Washington is forcing Seoul into a more confrontational stance toward Beijing could lead to protests about the U.S. role in Korean affairs and Yoon's acceptance of American demands.
Instead, Yoon should tell Biden that he is willing for Korea to serve as a good-faith broker in stabilizing Sino-American relations based on Seoul's reasonably good relations with Beijing.
Yoon is also likely to face domestic criticism if he delays the transfer of wartime operational control to the Korean military. Another potential source of pushback from the public will be his efforts to forge closer relations with Japan as part of a stronger defense against both North Korea and China. Koreans remain sharply divided on their attitudes toward Tokyo due to unresolved historical issues.
As a result, U.S.-Korean relations might be fraught with more tensions than Washington imagines since the Biden administration's foreign policy goals places Seoul in an awkward position in the contest between the U.S. and China. Will Seoul, for example, be willing to criticize Chinese human rights violations in Xinjiang and Hong Kong or support American efforts to bolster Taiwan in the face of a possible Chinese invasion?
In addition, Koreans may be unwilling to pay the economic price in confronting China if it leads to reduced business ties between the two countries. China now accounts for a quarter of Korea's total trade and has already used its economic clout to stage a boycott of some Korean products and businesses when Seoul accepted the deployment of THAAD batteries in 2017. Besides the loss of trade, Korea remains reliant on China for the supply of rare earth minerals and other inputs needed in the production of semiconductors and other tech products.
Another factor that Yoon needs to consider is that Beijing still has sway in Pyongyang and could serve as a useful partner in reducing inter-Korean tensions. Moreover, it will likely be difficult for Yoon to overcome domestic opposition to his foreign policy due to his narrow election win and his party's minority status in the National Assembly. Yoon is likely hoping to play on the growing anti-China public sentiment that began with Beijing's 2017 boycott actions.
But Washington may be greatly mistaken in believing that it can rely on Yoon to execute a major shift in Korean foreign policy when he is likely to face domestic opposition because of fears about a new Cold War with China. The sensible course for Yoon would be to focus on cooperation with the Quad nations in non-security issues such as climate change and regional infrastructure projects, while continuing to serve as a bridge to help resolve disputes between China and the U.S.
There are indications, however, that Biden may be hedging his bets when it comes to Yoon. The U.S. president is taking the rare step of planning to meet an outgoing leader, in this case Moon, during his visit to Seoul.
John Burton (johnburtonft@yahoo.com), a former Korea correspondent for the Financial Times, is a Washington, D.C.-based journalist and consultant.
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The election of Yoon was generally greeted warmly in Washington since he appears to check all the boxes when it comes to U.S. foreign policy goals. Unlike his predecessor Moon Jae-in, Yoon has taken a more hawkish response to North Korea's escalating missile and nuclear threats as he pledges to implement a "stronger deterrence." He has also signaled that he could support American efforts to contain China.
Yoon's administration is making much of the fact that it will be the earliest-ever summit between Seoul and Washington into the term of a new Korean president, only 11 days after Yoon's inauguration. Another perceived bonus point is that Biden is visiting Korea before Japan.
But Washington officials appear to have overlooked the fact that Yoon is already unpopular even before he took office. That could matter if the new president decides to carry out controversial policies such as accepting more U.S. THAAD anti-missile batteries or even the re-entry of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on Korean soil. Moreover, Yoon must deal with the fact that there has been broad public support for continued engagement with North Korea that was forged by President Moon.
Yoon has suggested that he would "positively review" joining the so-called Quad alliance of the U.S., Japan, India and Australia, which is viewed as an informal bloc against Beijing, despite the fact that China is Korea's largest trading partner.
The proposal that Korea should play an increased security role in America's Indo-Pacific strategy threatens to divide the public and might backfire for Washington. Public perceptions that Washington is forcing Seoul into a more confrontational stance toward Beijing could lead to protests about the U.S. role in Korean affairs and Yoon's acceptance of American demands.
Instead, Yoon should tell Biden that he is willing for Korea to serve as a good-faith broker in stabilizing Sino-American relations based on Seoul's reasonably good relations with Beijing.
Yoon is also likely to face domestic criticism if he delays the transfer of wartime operational control to the Korean military. Another potential source of pushback from the public will be his efforts to forge closer relations with Japan as part of a stronger defense against both North Korea and China. Koreans remain sharply divided on their attitudes toward Tokyo due to unresolved historical issues.
As a result, U.S.-Korean relations might be fraught with more tensions than Washington imagines since the Biden administration's foreign policy goals places Seoul in an awkward position in the contest between the U.S. and China. Will Seoul, for example, be willing to criticize Chinese human rights violations in Xinjiang and Hong Kong or support American efforts to bolster Taiwan in the face of a possible Chinese invasion?
In addition, Koreans may be unwilling to pay the economic price in confronting China if it leads to reduced business ties between the two countries. China now accounts for a quarter of Korea's total trade and has already used its economic clout to stage a boycott of some Korean products and businesses when Seoul accepted the deployment of THAAD batteries in 2017. Besides the loss of trade, Korea remains reliant on China for the supply of rare earth minerals and other inputs needed in the production of semiconductors and other tech products.
Another factor that Yoon needs to consider is that Beijing still has sway in Pyongyang and could serve as a useful partner in reducing inter-Korean tensions. Moreover, it will likely be difficult for Yoon to overcome domestic opposition to his foreign policy due to his narrow election win and his party's minority status in the National Assembly. Yoon is likely hoping to play on the growing anti-China public sentiment that began with Beijing's 2017 boycott actions.
But Washington may be greatly mistaken in believing that it can rely on Yoon to execute a major shift in Korean foreign policy when he is likely to face domestic opposition because of fears about a new Cold War with China. The sensible course for Yoon would be to focus on cooperation with the Quad nations in non-security issues such as climate change and regional infrastructure projects, while continuing to serve as a bridge to help resolve disputes between China and the U.S.
There are indications, however, that Biden may be hedging his bets when it comes to Yoon. The U.S. president is taking the rare step of planning to meet an outgoing leader, in this case Moon, during his visit to Seoul.
John Burton (johnburtonft@yahoo.com), a former Korea correspondent for the Financial Times, is a Washington, D.C.-based journalist and consultant.
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