Arms control

By John Burton

U.S. President-elect Joe Biden has the opportunity to forge a new path in terms of U.S. policy toward North Korea by embracing the idea that an arms control agreement with Pyongyang rather than denuclearization should be Washington's immediate primary goal.

It is abundantly clear that Washington's quest of 30 years to force North Korea to end its nuclear and long-range missile program has failed. The genie cannot be put back into the bottle. The only reasonable alternative is for the U.S. and North Korea to sign an arms control agreement that would put limits on North Korea's future development of nuclear and missile technology, similar to the agreements that the U.S. signed with the Soviet Union in the 1980s and 1990s.

There are concerns that a Biden administration might revert to the policy of "strategic patience" of the Obama administration, during which there was little engagement with North Korea as Washington relied on sanctions and other pressure tactics in a futile attempt to bend Pyongyang to its will.

But there appears to be a growing consensus among foreign policy experts in Washington that some type of interim arms control agreement should be pursued without giving up the long-term goal of North Korea's denuclearization.

While Biden appears to be interested in reviving the U.S. nuclear deal with Iran that was scrapped by President Donald Trump, he should make a similar deal with North Korea. This would involve North Korea disclosing all of its nuclear and missile programs, freezing nuclear enrichment and processing activities under international supervision, and limiting the number of its nuclear warheads and missiles.

But Biden would need to offer concessions to get North Korea to agree to such a deal. It would be up to the U.S. to make the first conciliatory moves, perhaps in coordination with the Moon Jae-in administration.

This outreach could include an offer to resume working-level negotiations with North Korea; scaling down joint U.S.-South Korea military exercises next March; easing some sanctions for a limited time; ending the U.S. travel ban to North Korea; promising to increase humanitarian aid, possibly through more funding for U.N. agencies operating in North Korea; and offering to deliver COVID-19 vaccines.

This would encourage North Korea to respond in kind with its own trust-building measures such as maintaining its moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile tests, renew its pledge to dismantle the Yongbyon nuclear site and the Dongchang-ri missile launch facility, and resume cooperative ventures with South Korea.

These moves toward re-engagement between the two countries could lead to a return to the issues that were already being discussed in the 1990s under President Bill Clinton, when a nuclear deal appeared close. On the table would be declaring an end to the Korean War; opening liaison offices in each other's capital; reducing military exercises; reviving Four-Party Talks involving the U.S., China and the two Koreas; more humanitarian aid; the repatriation of the remains of American servicemen killed during the Korean War; and easing restrictions on North Koreans traveling to the U.S.

Biden must also build upon Trump's diplomatic opening to Pyongyang, when he met North Korean leader Kim Jong-un three times. This includes reaffirming the 2018 Singapore agreement that was signed between Trump and Kim, which would signal that the U.S. remains open to engagement. Under the Singapore agreement, the North pledged to work toward the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in return for U.S. security guarantees, similar to a promise made by Pyongyang to President Clinton.

This move may upset some Democrats who believe that everything Trump did was wrong, but it would be good politics in winning support among Republican lawmakers for future initiatives on North Korea that Biden might make. The lack of bipartisan support in Congress eventually helped kill President Clinton's outreach to North Korea as Republican lawmakers adopted a hard line. Trump may encourage Republicans in Congress to oppose the new administration's Korea policy in the belief that he could solve the problem instead if he is re-elected in 2024.

At the same time, Biden must avoid the one big mistake that Trump made in negotiating with Kim ― demanding an all-or-nothing nuclear deal. After Trump's engagement policy produced some early gains, this stance, pushed by hawks in Washington, including Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and National Security Advisor John Bolton, led to the collapse of the Hanoi summit in 2019. The nuclear talks have been deadlocked ever since.

Biden must make his intentions clear to Pyongyang as soon as he takes office in January. One opportunity could come with the Senate confirmation hearings for Secretary of State nominee Antony Blinken, declaring he supports an engagement policy. This message might dissuade Pyongyang from testing Biden's resolve by conducting a missile or even a nuclear test.

John Burton (johnburtonft@yahoo.com), a former Korea correspondent for the Financial Times, is a Washington, D.C.-based journalist and consultant.