By John Burton
Korea and several other nations in the Asia-Pacific region ― Taiwan, New Zealand, Australia, Vietnam and Thailand ― have successfully contained the COVID-19 outbreak. The leadership of these middle-sized powers in responding to the pandemic has provoked talk of the "rise of the rest," meaning countries that can play a more influential and independent global role between the superpowers of the United States and China.
Whether they will be able to do so will be tested by the growing Sino-American tensions that have resulted from the pandemic. The middle powers will need to strike a balance between the superpowers if they want to maintain an independent voice in global affairs.
The difficulty of achieving a middle way between the superpowers is exemplified by the challenges that Korea faces. On the one hand, Seoul is facing increasing pressure from Washington to pay more for the stationing of U.S. troops in the country. In addition, the Trump administration wants Korea to stop supplying computer chips to Huawei, which the U.S. views as a security threat in the emerging 5G sector.
The U.S. demands not only threaten to damage Korea's all-important semiconductor industry, but could provoke a harsh response from China if Korea abandons its neutral stance and takes the American side in the dispute. Beijing would likely take retaliatory measures similar to what happened following the deployment of the THAAD missile system several years ago.
Korea also needs to avoid antagonizing China, its biggest trading partner, because of the strategic threat it poses due to its close geographical proximity. However, China's coercive tactics, as in the case of THAAD, have increased negative views of China among Koreans. A favorable view of China in Korea has fallen from 61 percent in 2015 to 34 percent at the end of 2019, according to a Pew Research poll.
The best option for Korea is to try to play a constructive role as an intermediary between the two superpowers. One way that it could do so is if Korea bands together with other middle powers in East Asia to strengthen their strategic and economic capabilities and resist superpower pressure.
One potential ally for Korea in this effort would be the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN faces similar geostrategic challenges as Korea. China is increasing its control over the South China Sea, which has angered several maritime ASEAN countries such as Vietnam and Malaysia. At the same time, the U.S. is increasing pressure on ASEAN countries to join an Indo-Pacific alliance to contain China.
There is growing distrust in ASEAN of both the U.S. and China as a result. ASEAN would prefer to steer a middle course between the two superpowers.
The fallout from COVID-19 pandemic provides an opportunity for middle powers, including Korea and ASEAN, to seek a balance of power in East Asia.
Both Korea and ASEAN, for example, are committed to rules-based agreements and institutions in key areas such as cyber and environmental policy, which has become a battleground between the U.S. and China.
President Moon Jae-in has laid the foundation for closer cooperation with ASEAN with his New Southern Policy (NSP), which he announced in 2017. The NSP's stated goal is to "elevate Korea's relationship with ASEAN to the level of its relations with four major powers around the Korean Peninsula," meaning the U.S., China, Japan and Russia. This represents an unprecedented priority being given to ASEAN in Korea's foreign policy.
The focus of the NSP so far has been economic rather than strategic, with Korea increasing trade, investment and development assistance in the region, particularly with Vietnam. ASEAN is already Korea's second largest trading partner, third largest investment destination and most popular tourist destination.
Nonetheless, there is a strategic aspect to the NSP. Korea is hoping to increase arms sales to ASEAN countries. In addition, many ASEAN countries have diplomatic ties with Pyongyang, which could allow them to play a mediating role in inter-Korean relations.
More importantly, Korea and ASEAN have the shared goal of reducing their dependence on U.S. and Chinese markets. This would not only offer protection from the uncertainties arising from the superpower rivalry, but counter pressure for them to take sides.
Korea already enjoys a good reputation in Southeast Asia based on soft power diplomacy in the region, from the popularity of the Korean wave to advice it has provided to governments on how to help contain the COVID-19 outbreak.
A more aggressive China and a more unpredictable U.S. threaten to upset the post-Cold War order in East Asia, which makes Korea's outreach to ASEAN even more imperative. President Moon has personally devoted considerable time and energy in pursuing this mission. He should not be distracted by recent inter-Korean tensions in continuing to vigorously tackle this effort.
John Burton (johnburtonft@yahoo.com), a former Korea correspondent for the Financial Times, is a Washington, D.C.-based journalist and consultant.
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Whether they will be able to do so will be tested by the growing Sino-American tensions that have resulted from the pandemic. The middle powers will need to strike a balance between the superpowers if they want to maintain an independent voice in global affairs.
The difficulty of achieving a middle way between the superpowers is exemplified by the challenges that Korea faces. On the one hand, Seoul is facing increasing pressure from Washington to pay more for the stationing of U.S. troops in the country. In addition, the Trump administration wants Korea to stop supplying computer chips to Huawei, which the U.S. views as a security threat in the emerging 5G sector.
The U.S. demands not only threaten to damage Korea's all-important semiconductor industry, but could provoke a harsh response from China if Korea abandons its neutral stance and takes the American side in the dispute. Beijing would likely take retaliatory measures similar to what happened following the deployment of the THAAD missile system several years ago.
Korea also needs to avoid antagonizing China, its biggest trading partner, because of the strategic threat it poses due to its close geographical proximity. However, China's coercive tactics, as in the case of THAAD, have increased negative views of China among Koreans. A favorable view of China in Korea has fallen from 61 percent in 2015 to 34 percent at the end of 2019, according to a Pew Research poll.
The best option for Korea is to try to play a constructive role as an intermediary between the two superpowers. One way that it could do so is if Korea bands together with other middle powers in East Asia to strengthen their strategic and economic capabilities and resist superpower pressure.
One potential ally for Korea in this effort would be the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN faces similar geostrategic challenges as Korea. China is increasing its control over the South China Sea, which has angered several maritime ASEAN countries such as Vietnam and Malaysia. At the same time, the U.S. is increasing pressure on ASEAN countries to join an Indo-Pacific alliance to contain China.
There is growing distrust in ASEAN of both the U.S. and China as a result. ASEAN would prefer to steer a middle course between the two superpowers.
The fallout from COVID-19 pandemic provides an opportunity for middle powers, including Korea and ASEAN, to seek a balance of power in East Asia.
Both Korea and ASEAN, for example, are committed to rules-based agreements and institutions in key areas such as cyber and environmental policy, which has become a battleground between the U.S. and China.
President Moon Jae-in has laid the foundation for closer cooperation with ASEAN with his New Southern Policy (NSP), which he announced in 2017. The NSP's stated goal is to "elevate Korea's relationship with ASEAN to the level of its relations with four major powers around the Korean Peninsula," meaning the U.S., China, Japan and Russia. This represents an unprecedented priority being given to ASEAN in Korea's foreign policy.
The focus of the NSP so far has been economic rather than strategic, with Korea increasing trade, investment and development assistance in the region, particularly with Vietnam. ASEAN is already Korea's second largest trading partner, third largest investment destination and most popular tourist destination.
Nonetheless, there is a strategic aspect to the NSP. Korea is hoping to increase arms sales to ASEAN countries. In addition, many ASEAN countries have diplomatic ties with Pyongyang, which could allow them to play a mediating role in inter-Korean relations.
More importantly, Korea and ASEAN have the shared goal of reducing their dependence on U.S. and Chinese markets. This would not only offer protection from the uncertainties arising from the superpower rivalry, but counter pressure for them to take sides.
Korea already enjoys a good reputation in Southeast Asia based on soft power diplomacy in the region, from the popularity of the Korean wave to advice it has provided to governments on how to help contain the COVID-19 outbreak.
A more aggressive China and a more unpredictable U.S. threaten to upset the post-Cold War order in East Asia, which makes Korea's outreach to ASEAN even more imperative. President Moon has personally devoted considerable time and energy in pursuing this mission. He should not be distracted by recent inter-Korean tensions in continuing to vigorously tackle this effort.
John Burton (johnburtonft@yahoo.com), a former Korea correspondent for the Financial Times, is a Washington, D.C.-based journalist and consultant.
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