By John Burton
The theatrical destruction by North Korea of the inter-Korean liaison office in Gaeseong last week carries a clear message: Pyongyang is frustrated about its apparent inability to get the international sanctions regime against it eased.
The crisis has been building for some time. To understand why, it is useful to briefly review the history of the sanctions policy. Although the U.S. has been applying unilateral sanctions against North Korea for decades, it was only in 2006 that the United Nations began applying international sanctions in response to North Korea's first nuclear test.
The U.N. sanctions initially applied to technology and materials that could be used to support the North's nuclear program. But as Pyongyang continued to pursue the development of nuclear weapons, new U.N. sanctions were added. By 2016, these expanded sanctions were aimed at not only the North's military sector, but also the civilian economy.
A key turning point came in 2017 during the height of tensions caused by an accelerated series of nuclear and missile tests by the North. The U.N. approved measures proposed by the U.S. to severely limit imports by North Korea of crude oil and refined petroleum products as well as many types of machinery.
The new sanctions threatened to devastate the North's already fragile agricultural sector since the banned energy products were needed to produce necessary products such as fertilizers. This increased the prospects of growing hunger when the North already could not feed about a third of its 25 million people.
The pressure tactics, however, appeared to work. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un offered an olive branch at the start of 2018 that led to summits with President Moon Jae-in and U.S. President Donald Trump that year.
Kim was clearly hoping that the meetings would result in reduced sanctions. But things fell apart after Trump adopted a hardline stance at the suggestion of his then National Security Adviser John Bolton at his second summit with Kim in Hanoi in February 2019.
Kim then warned that he would pursue a "new direction" if no progress on sanctions relief was made by the end of 2019. Kim maintained this stance on the matter and North Korea this year stepped up short-range missile tests, launched hostile propaganda attacks against South Korea and severed inter-Korean communication links before demolishing the liaison office.
The ostensible reason for the destruction of the liaison office was that it was in response to the launch of propaganda balloons into the North by anti-regime refugees. But the real reason was to press President Moon to intervene with the Trump administration to adopt a more conciliatory policy toward Pyongyang by easing sanctions.
Kim is clearly upset that Moon's actions have not lived up to his promises of detente. He might be hoping that increased pressure might force South Korea to break ranks with its U.S. ally by unilaterally pursuing inter-Korean economic projects that are now banned by the U.N. sanctions.
The North Korean leader may also believe that ratcheting up tensions to win sanctions relief is necessary when his country's economy is in dire straits due to Pyongyang's stringent measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19 from China.
Kim's gamble may not pay off. President Trump appears to have lost interest in the North Korea issue as he struggles to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic and public protests over racial injustice as his chances of reelection this year diminish. Bolton claims in his new memoir that Trump only wanted to have a summit with Kim in 2018 because he saw it as "an exercise in publicity" and showed little interest in the details of North Korea's denuclearization. Moreover, President Moon is under domestic pressure to adopt a more hardline position toward the North.
Is there any way to de-escalate the crisis? It is noteworthy that Kim has not directly challenged the U.S. but instead has used South Korea as a scapegoat. This indicates that Kim is still open to doing a deal with the U.S. The North, for example, has not yet taken more provocative steps such as resuming its nuclear and long-range tests, which would enrage Washington.
Would Trump be interested in re-engaging with Pyongyang? Possibly yes, if it holds the promise of a much-needed diplomatic victory before the November presidential election. Trump has already blamed Bolton for "setting us back" with North Korea at the Hanoi summit.
One possible compromise solution has been proposed by former CIA director and Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who in a new book suggests that the U.S. should accept the fact that North Korea will remain a nuclear power. He says that Washington should allow the North to keep a limited number of nuclear weapons as long as Pyongyang accepts on-site inspections of its arsenal.
John Burton (johnburtonft@yahoo.com), a former Korea correspondent for the Financial Times, is a Washington, D.C.-based journalist and consultant.
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The crisis has been building for some time. To understand why, it is useful to briefly review the history of the sanctions policy. Although the U.S. has been applying unilateral sanctions against North Korea for decades, it was only in 2006 that the United Nations began applying international sanctions in response to North Korea's first nuclear test.
The U.N. sanctions initially applied to technology and materials that could be used to support the North's nuclear program. But as Pyongyang continued to pursue the development of nuclear weapons, new U.N. sanctions were added. By 2016, these expanded sanctions were aimed at not only the North's military sector, but also the civilian economy.
A key turning point came in 2017 during the height of tensions caused by an accelerated series of nuclear and missile tests by the North. The U.N. approved measures proposed by the U.S. to severely limit imports by North Korea of crude oil and refined petroleum products as well as many types of machinery.
The new sanctions threatened to devastate the North's already fragile agricultural sector since the banned energy products were needed to produce necessary products such as fertilizers. This increased the prospects of growing hunger when the North already could not feed about a third of its 25 million people.
The pressure tactics, however, appeared to work. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un offered an olive branch at the start of 2018 that led to summits with President Moon Jae-in and U.S. President Donald Trump that year.
Kim was clearly hoping that the meetings would result in reduced sanctions. But things fell apart after Trump adopted a hardline stance at the suggestion of his then National Security Adviser John Bolton at his second summit with Kim in Hanoi in February 2019.
Kim then warned that he would pursue a "new direction" if no progress on sanctions relief was made by the end of 2019. Kim maintained this stance on the matter and North Korea this year stepped up short-range missile tests, launched hostile propaganda attacks against South Korea and severed inter-Korean communication links before demolishing the liaison office.
The ostensible reason for the destruction of the liaison office was that it was in response to the launch of propaganda balloons into the North by anti-regime refugees. But the real reason was to press President Moon to intervene with the Trump administration to adopt a more conciliatory policy toward Pyongyang by easing sanctions.
Kim is clearly upset that Moon's actions have not lived up to his promises of detente. He might be hoping that increased pressure might force South Korea to break ranks with its U.S. ally by unilaterally pursuing inter-Korean economic projects that are now banned by the U.N. sanctions.
The North Korean leader may also believe that ratcheting up tensions to win sanctions relief is necessary when his country's economy is in dire straits due to Pyongyang's stringent measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19 from China.
Kim's gamble may not pay off. President Trump appears to have lost interest in the North Korea issue as he struggles to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic and public protests over racial injustice as his chances of reelection this year diminish. Bolton claims in his new memoir that Trump only wanted to have a summit with Kim in 2018 because he saw it as "an exercise in publicity" and showed little interest in the details of North Korea's denuclearization. Moreover, President Moon is under domestic pressure to adopt a more hardline position toward the North.
Is there any way to de-escalate the crisis? It is noteworthy that Kim has not directly challenged the U.S. but instead has used South Korea as a scapegoat. This indicates that Kim is still open to doing a deal with the U.S. The North, for example, has not yet taken more provocative steps such as resuming its nuclear and long-range tests, which would enrage Washington.
Would Trump be interested in re-engaging with Pyongyang? Possibly yes, if it holds the promise of a much-needed diplomatic victory before the November presidential election. Trump has already blamed Bolton for "setting us back" with North Korea at the Hanoi summit.
One possible compromise solution has been proposed by former CIA director and Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who in a new book suggests that the U.S. should accept the fact that North Korea will remain a nuclear power. He says that Washington should allow the North to keep a limited number of nuclear weapons as long as Pyongyang accepts on-site inspections of its arsenal.
John Burton (johnburtonft@yahoo.com), a former Korea correspondent for the Financial Times, is a Washington, D.C.-based journalist and consultant.
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