United front

By John Burton

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un began his diplomatic breakout a year ago when he met Chinese President Xi Jinping in March 2018 and then followed up with Moon Jae-in and U.S. President Donald Trump. He has now concluded this initial outreach campaign by meeting Russian President Vladimir Putin last week in Vladivostok.

In the process, Kim has acquired two valuable allies in China and Russia who are likely to help push back against U.S. pressure on North Korea. Both Beijing and Moscow share similar attitudes on the nuclear issue and are likely to cooperate closely in the future.

Although China and Russia, two of the five permanent U.N. Security Council members, have publicly stated that they favor a non-nuclear status for the Korean Peninsula, both realize that this is probably not a realistic goal because Pyongyang will be unwilling to give up its nuclear weapons since they are the only guarantee of Kim's survival.

Moreover, they view U.S pressure on North Korea as an example of what they believe is Washington's policy of deposing regimes it does not like. China and Russia have embraced the principle of non-interference in resisting Western intervention in countries ranging from Syria to Libya.

But this does not mean that China and Russia are happy about North Korea's nuclear status. They worry that the North Korea's example could encourage other countries to acquire nuclear weapons and thus undermine the global non-proliferation regime that they support. Moreover, they fear that Pyongyang could sell nuclear technology to other rogue states and terrorist groups if international sanctions force the North to find alternative sources of income.

Finally, North Korea's continued possession of nuclear weapons raises the possibility of a destructive conflict breaking out on their borders if the U.S decides to launch an attack to end Pyongyang's nuclear program. Meanwhile, Washington is using the nuclear threat as a rationale to install anti-missile systems in South Korea and Japan that Beijing and Moscow would like to see removed because they believe these defense systems could weaken China's and Russia's strategic nuclear deterrents.

China and Russia apparently agree that although they will never formally recognize North Korea as a nuclear state, they are also unwilling to support "maximum pressure" sanctions that could lead to the collapse of the North because of the dire security consequences that would result from that situation.

Beijing and Moscow also appear ready to lend support to North Korea out of resentment over Trump's tough stance on trade issues with China and U.S. sanctions on Russia for the annexation of the Crimea.

So what are the likely policies of China and Russia going forward when it comes to Pyongyang?

One possibility is that Beijing and Moscow will push for the resumption of the six-party talks, suspended since 2009, to find a solution to the North Korea nuclear issue since this would give them more diplomatic leverage.

Putin hinted at this prospect after his meeting with Kim by saying that the North needed security guarantees from other nations besides the U.S. before it abandons its nuclear arsenal.

The two countries will also likely use their veto power on the U.N. Security Council to soften any proposed tough new international sanctions on North Korea.

Another goal is to maintain the "freeze for freeze" proposal that they have supported since 2017 under which Pyongyang would freeze its nuclear and missile tests in return for the U.S. and South Korea freezing some joint military exercises. Trump last year essentially adopted this policy without specifically acknowledging it.

China and Russia will argue that the success of the "freeze for freeze" concept supports their position that progress can only be achieved by a gradual process of trading disarmament for sanctions relief. This is a rejection of the "big deal" proposed by Trump at the Hanoi summit with Kim that North Korea must first dismantle its nuclear weapons program before sanctions are lifted. The hardline U.S. proposal helped caused the summit's sudden collapse.

Also expect a revival of talks about implementing long-term infrastructure projects with North Korea that would involve China's Belt and Road Initiative and Russia's plans to construct a gas pipeline through North Korea to South Korea, share electricity systems, and build a railway link to connect the two Koreas to the Trans-Siberian Railway.

All these projects are now blocked because of the U.N. sanctions, but China and Russia may argue they are needed to support North Korea's economic development and encourage its opening to foreign investment.

The peninsula has once again become the center of renewed competition among China, Russia and the U.S. Beijing and Moscow have made it clear that they want to reassert themselves as central actors in managing security issues in Northeast Asia. The key question is how Washington will response to that.

John Burton (johnburtonft@yahoo.com), a former Korea correspondent for the Financial Times, is now a Washington, D.C.-based journalist and consultant.