By John Burton
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The traditional national security community in the U.S. is already predicting the summit will be a failure. That view is influenced by dated Cold War strategic thinking. There is a reluctance to acknowledge that Trump, Kim and President Moon Jae-in are trying to break the long-standing stalemate over North Korea's nuclear issue with experimental and top-down diplomacy that challenges conventional wisdom.
The first Trump-Kim summit in Singapore last June was largely dismissed by U.S. commentators on both the right and left as a triumph of showbiz over substance. This ignores the fact that the meeting deliberately focused on establishing a personal bond between the two leaders, an essential element if a deal should be reached. It also explains why the emphasis at the first summit was on establishing the overarching principle of the "complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" instead of diving immediately into details on how this could be achieved.
No doubt, the upcoming summit will be more challenging than the first since it will begin tackling details of next steps, which will demand concessions from both sides.
Although the bargaining carries the risks of creating new tensions, Trump and Kim appear committed to keeping their rapprochement going. Trump wants to score a foreign policy victory, while Kim views the talks as an opportunity to improve relations with China, South Korea, Russia and Japan to reduce Pyongyang's isolation and deflect U.S. military pressure.
It is the highly personalized nature of the negotiations between Trump and Kim that is driving U.S. national security professionals crazy. They are being largely left out of a process that breaks traditional diplomatic norms. They argue their involvement is vital since they claim Kim is playing Trump, while they raise unrealistically high expectations among the American public that North Korea should denuclearize immediately.
But the Trump administration recognizes that North Korea's denuclearization will be a long-term process that will take 10 years or more to achieve. It is only looking now for modest but tangible concessions that will keep the top-level summitry on track.
The most likely outcome of the Hanoi summit will be the U.S. agreeing to a declaration ending the Korean War and scaling back or canceling joint military exercises with Seoul. In return, Pyongyang would allow some nuclear inspectors into the country and dismantle more nuclear and missile facilities, while keeping its freeze on nuclear and missile testing in place. These steps could be accompanied by a partial easing of U.S. sanctions.
It will be difficult for U.S. hawks to claim Trump is selling out South Korea by declaring an end to the Korean War ― thus setting the stage for the possible withdrawal of U.S. troops ― when this has been the policy of President Moon.
Moon's efforts to ease military tensions, such as dismantling some guard posts along the DMZ in cooperation with Pyongyang, are providing crucial cover for Trump in making an end-of-war declaration and claiming he has brought peace to the Korean Peninsula.
In addition, Kim has a stake in keeping his reconciliation with the U.S. on a smooth trajectory since he probably recognizes that Trump is unique among American political leaders in wanting to break the decades-long deadlock in bilateral relations. This will help North Korea reduce its reliance on China, while boosting Kim's prestige at home and overseas.
The prospects for peace on the peninsula have already improved greatly even if Trump and Kim do not make significant progress at the Hanoi summit. The threat of war has receded. Kim appears determined to break North Korea's isolation. He is expected to continue meeting with the leaders of China and South Korea and might hold talks as well with those from Russia and Japan this year. This represents considerable momentum toward stability in Northeast Asia.
Trump, Kim and Moon appear to have a better grasp of the rapid changes on the peninsula, which really only began a year ago with the PyeongChang Winter Olympics, than a U.S. foreign policy establishment that appears set in its ways.
It is time for U.S. diplomats and national security professionals to get on board to deal with this new reality. They must move forward and build on the progress already made. They need to deal with the situation as it is and not what they wish it to be.
John Burton (johnburtonft@yahoo.com), a former Korea correspondent for the Financial Times, is now a Washington, D.C.-based journalist and consultant.
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