Hope springs eternal

By John Burton

In 1992, when I was appointed Korea correspondent for the Financial Times, my editors and I thought I would be covering the end of the Cold War on the Korean Peninsula, following the demise of the Soviet Union just months earlier. After all, the two Koreas had just signed in December 1991 a basic agreement on reconciliation, non-aggression and cooperation and exchanges.

Of course, that agreement proved to be a false dawn, along with several other inter-Korean peace agreements that started with the 1972 joint communique under Park Chung-hee and continued through the 2000 Joint Declaration under Kim Dae-jung and the 2007 peace declaration under Roh Moo-hyun. So will the deal reached between President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un on Friday be any different?

The answer lies in why the earlier agreements failed and if anything has changed since. The 1972 agreement, for example, promised that the two Koreas would pursue reunification in a peaceful manner, but neither side was willing to compromise when rival proposals were offered on how this could be achieved. This reflected continuing mistrust stemming from the Korean War and the refusal of each side to regard the other as being a legitimate government. Continued military clashes along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) did not help the situation.

Changes in the global geostrategic situation also influenced these agreements. The 1972 agreement coincided with detente between the U.S. and China. The 1991 agreement and an accompanying joint declaration on denuclearization in 1992 followed the collapse of the Communist Eastern bloc.

Prospects for peaceful coexistence appeared brighter in the early 1990s, with the two Koreas agreeing to respect each other's systems and pursuing inter-Korean sports events, economic cooperation and family reunions. But the mood soon soured as Pyongyang continued its nuclear weapons program and military provocations that were countered by growing U.S.-South Korean military exercises.

The rise of progressive administration in Seoul and the introduction of the sunshine policy provided a new opportunity for inter-Korean detente in the early 21st century and led to the 2000 and 2007 agreements. The hallmark of these agreements was economic cooperation, including the Gaeseong Industrial Complex. But, again, these agreements unraveled due to Pyongyang's pursuit of nuclear weapons and military attacks, such as the sinking of the Cheonan and the bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island.

A combination of favorable international conditions, growing recognition of each other's governments as legitimate, and a willingness by Seoul to make concessions have underpinned past agreements. But a revival of Pyongyang's aggressiveness then derailed them.

Whether the Panmunjeom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula will meet the same fate depends on whether Pyongyang has really changed its tune now and is willing to make concessions as well.

There is reason for cautious optimism. Kim Jong-un appears more interested than his father and grandfather in transforming North Korea into a status quo regional power and ensuring his continuing rule by focusing on economic development. He has suggested that he would accept the continued presence of U.S. troops in South Korea, for example, in what would be a major concession.

A key obstacle for both Koreas is ending the mistrust between them. If an atmosphere of trust can be achieved, then Kim might follow through on his new promise of denuclearization. That places a great deal of responsibility on the shoulders of President Moon, who must now persuade U.S. President Donald Trump to take a less uncompromising attitude toward Pyongyang and be willing to make concessions on such issues as U.S. diplomatic recognition of North Korea and the signing of a peace treaty.

What can be said is that the positive outcome of the Moon-Kim summit makes it more likely that the Trump-Kim summit will take place in the next few weeks. Trump, moreover, seems keen to win a Nobel Peace Prize for helping bring peace to the Korean Peninsula.

The devil, of course, will be in the details. What does North Korea mean by "denuclearization" and will it demand that U.S. foreswear the use of nuclear weapons in response? Will Pyongyang accept intrusive nuclear inspections?

A denuclearization deal will also depend on whether the U.S. is willing to make concessions. Will the U.S., for example, be willing to ease economic sanctions before North Korea gives up its nuclear weapons? Will Washington make other demands, such as Pyongyang also giving up its chemical and biological weapons stockpile, reduce its conventional military forces or promise to improve its terrible human rights record? There will be other complications in that China will need to be brought into final negotiations over a formal peace treaty to end the Korean War.

But I'm still hoping that the introduction of new conditions and new leaders will mean that the fifth attempt to establish peace on the Korean Peninsula will succeed where previous attempts have failed.

John Burton (johnburtonft@yahoo.com), a former Korea correspondent for the Financial Times, is now a Washington, D.C.-based journalist and consultant.