By John Burton
North Korea's recent declaration that it would remain a nuclear state and that its decision was "irreversible" underscores the complete failure of U.S. policy toward Pyongyang over the last two decades.
The statement received surprisingly little attention in the U.S. since the news was overshadowed by the death of Queen Elizabeth II and the ongoing war in Ukraine. Some sought to dismiss its significance since North Korea had already declared itself a nuclear state a decade ago.
But North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in a speech before his parliament added several conditions that will make it even harder for the U.S. to achieve its goal of North Korea's complete nuclear disarmament.
Kim said his country would never again engage in talks on its denuclearization. He also introduced a new nuclear doctrine that did not rule out launching a preemptive nuclear "first strike" if the regime considered it was under immediate threat. He also appeared to give military field commanders the authority to launch a nuclear strike if the leadership in Pyongyang was wiped out
The setback for the U.S. is on a par with its policy failures in Iraq and Afghanistan. So what can Washington do now?
The answer is that U.S. officials should face reality. For some time, the goal of full denuclearization has appeared to be delusional. Most experts concluded long ago that it was unlikely that North Korea would give up all its nuclear weapons since they were viewed by its leadership as vital to national security.
Possessing nuclear weapons also appeals to Pyongyang's nationalist vanity to be accepted as a serious global power despite the country's small size and troubled economy.
The best that the U.S. can hope for is to engage in arms control negotiations to freeze or reduce North Korea's nuclear stockpile, while allowing Pyongyang to keep some of its weapons. In return, Washington would lift most or all of its sanctions.
The outlines of such a deal were discussed during the 2019 Hanoi summit between President Donald Trump and Kim before the former decided it would make him look weak.
The administration of President Joe Biden would face similar criticism if he decided to pursue this course of action, particularly if the Republicans take control of Congress in the midterm elections next month.
Moreover, it would likely provoke a clash with the hawkish President Yoon Suk-yeol, who wants to take a tougher stance against his northern neighbor. It would be easy to imagine Seoul accusing Washington of "selling out" one of its closest allies. Japan would likely react in a similar manner. In response, both Seoul and Tokyo might decide to pursue their own nuclear weapons programs.
These developments would deal a serious blow to the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, which has been cited by Washington in the past as a rationale for its demand for North Korea's complete denuclearization.
But failing to reach an arms control agreement with Pyongyang would mean that North Korea would continue to develop even more advanced nuclear weapons and delivery systems that would enable it to launch a nuclear attack as far as the U.S.
If an arms control deal with Pyongyang is off the table, the alternatives also look bleak.
Pursuing sanctions against North Korea has proved ineffective in deterring its nuclear build-up. Winning more U.N. sanctions is likely to prove difficult, as Russia and China are likely to veto them since they regard North Korea as an ally in their increasing confrontation with the West. A key test of sanctions support will come if North Korea conducts a seventh nuclear test later this year.
North Korea appears to have built an economic system able to survive sanctions despite severe humanitarian challenges. Moreover, there is little left to sanction.
As a result, Washington and Seoul appear ready to double down and increase the pressure on Pyongyang by adopting a more assertive military stance. This includes the recent revival of joint defense exercises, positioning U.S. aircraft carriers and bombers closer to the Korean Peninsula and increasing missile testing.
The new North Korean nuclear doctrine may have been meant to deter any military action by Washington and Seoul by raising its costs. But actions on both sides risk creating a vicious cycle of escalating confrontation.
It may be too late now to pursue confidence-building measures that had previously been proposed, including partial sanctions relief, the suspension of joint Korea-U.S. military exercises, and the signing of an end-of-war declaration to replace the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement.
The security situation on the Korean Peninsula is approaching a hair-trigger point. It may behoove both sides to tone down their threats and try to find ways to resume some form of engagement.
John Burton (johnburtonft@yahoo.com), a former Korea correspondent for the Financial Times, is a Washington, D.C.-based journalist and consultant.
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The statement received surprisingly little attention in the U.S. since the news was overshadowed by the death of Queen Elizabeth II and the ongoing war in Ukraine. Some sought to dismiss its significance since North Korea had already declared itself a nuclear state a decade ago.
But North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in a speech before his parliament added several conditions that will make it even harder for the U.S. to achieve its goal of North Korea's complete nuclear disarmament.
Kim said his country would never again engage in talks on its denuclearization. He also introduced a new nuclear doctrine that did not rule out launching a preemptive nuclear "first strike" if the regime considered it was under immediate threat. He also appeared to give military field commanders the authority to launch a nuclear strike if the leadership in Pyongyang was wiped out
The setback for the U.S. is on a par with its policy failures in Iraq and Afghanistan. So what can Washington do now?
The answer is that U.S. officials should face reality. For some time, the goal of full denuclearization has appeared to be delusional. Most experts concluded long ago that it was unlikely that North Korea would give up all its nuclear weapons since they were viewed by its leadership as vital to national security.
Possessing nuclear weapons also appeals to Pyongyang's nationalist vanity to be accepted as a serious global power despite the country's small size and troubled economy.
The best that the U.S. can hope for is to engage in arms control negotiations to freeze or reduce North Korea's nuclear stockpile, while allowing Pyongyang to keep some of its weapons. In return, Washington would lift most or all of its sanctions.
The outlines of such a deal were discussed during the 2019 Hanoi summit between President Donald Trump and Kim before the former decided it would make him look weak.
The administration of President Joe Biden would face similar criticism if he decided to pursue this course of action, particularly if the Republicans take control of Congress in the midterm elections next month.
Moreover, it would likely provoke a clash with the hawkish President Yoon Suk-yeol, who wants to take a tougher stance against his northern neighbor. It would be easy to imagine Seoul accusing Washington of "selling out" one of its closest allies. Japan would likely react in a similar manner. In response, both Seoul and Tokyo might decide to pursue their own nuclear weapons programs.
These developments would deal a serious blow to the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, which has been cited by Washington in the past as a rationale for its demand for North Korea's complete denuclearization.
But failing to reach an arms control agreement with Pyongyang would mean that North Korea would continue to develop even more advanced nuclear weapons and delivery systems that would enable it to launch a nuclear attack as far as the U.S.
If an arms control deal with Pyongyang is off the table, the alternatives also look bleak.
Pursuing sanctions against North Korea has proved ineffective in deterring its nuclear build-up. Winning more U.N. sanctions is likely to prove difficult, as Russia and China are likely to veto them since they regard North Korea as an ally in their increasing confrontation with the West. A key test of sanctions support will come if North Korea conducts a seventh nuclear test later this year.
North Korea appears to have built an economic system able to survive sanctions despite severe humanitarian challenges. Moreover, there is little left to sanction.
As a result, Washington and Seoul appear ready to double down and increase the pressure on Pyongyang by adopting a more assertive military stance. This includes the recent revival of joint defense exercises, positioning U.S. aircraft carriers and bombers closer to the Korean Peninsula and increasing missile testing.
The new North Korean nuclear doctrine may have been meant to deter any military action by Washington and Seoul by raising its costs. But actions on both sides risk creating a vicious cycle of escalating confrontation.
It may be too late now to pursue confidence-building measures that had previously been proposed, including partial sanctions relief, the suspension of joint Korea-U.S. military exercises, and the signing of an end-of-war declaration to replace the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement.
The security situation on the Korean Peninsula is approaching a hair-trigger point. It may behoove both sides to tone down their threats and try to find ways to resume some form of engagement.
John Burton (johnburtonft@yahoo.com), a former Korea correspondent for the Financial Times, is a Washington, D.C.-based journalist and consultant.
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