By Stephen Costello
The decision to refuse visas for North Korean officials to travel to New York for unofficial talks was attributed by the Washington Post to the "State Department." Only unnamed sources were linked to the story. Again without attribution to any individual, the reason was claimed to be the death in Malaysia of Kim Jung Nam, half-brother of the North Korean leader. It was suggested that visas were unlikely to be granted even before the killing, and an official denied that "Track 2" talks were even considered, but that was neither attributed to anyone nor followed up on to discover who made the decision or why.
Whose decision?
Among crucial and pertinent matters that bear on this story, the existence of an ongoing "review of Korea policy" within the NSC at the White House went unmentioned. On the day when front page stories in the New York Times and Post noted that the Secretary of State appeared to be sidelined, and was not consulted on major issues, Secretary Rex Tillerson's participation in Korea policy – or nonparticipation – was not addressed. Like the story of the death of Kim Jung Nam, this leaves the biggest questions unanswered. Much more needs to be known in order for it to be useful.
In this administration, at this time, it is hard to believe this was a low-level decision. Far more – or less – had to be going on among the Trump group in order to make this choice. Talks would have been specifically "Track 1.5" since US participants would not have been government officials. If the decision has been made to refuse unofficial talks – requiring the least political courage of all possibilities – then the biggest questions within the rumored "policy review" at the NSC have now been answered. After this snub by Trump officials, a tricky and difficult beginning has now been made all but impossible. All that's left for the NSC review to decide is whether to escalate military exercises, sanctions, or other coercive measures, or to pursue all three.
Critical timing
The timing of the proposed visit would have coincided with the beginning of US and ROK military exercises, designed to provoke insecurity in the North, among other things. That, in turn, provided a chance for both sides to make small, symbolic gestures to open space for dialogue. Such gestures could have included scaling back, moving or rebranding the exercises on the US and ROK side, and a degree of acceptance of some exercises on the DPRK side. Already, the US released a rare shipment of food to North Korea as one of the last acts of the Obama presidency, and it was noticed in Pyongyang.
It is not a surprise that the Trump administration has embraced the ‘fear of talks' with North Korea, which has helped destroy the possibility for denuclearization, greater economic development or tension reduction on the Korean Peninsula over the past 15 years. Republicans and ideologues who surround the White House are the least likely to notice the long list of opportunities that might open up if a US-DPRK contact were to resume. Still, many professionals, experienced former officials, and knowledgeable specialists have been imploring the new administration to at least listen to North Korean views and explore the possibilities.
Fateful decision
It may well be that the decision to refuse safe, unofficial talks, whether taken by President Trump or low-level officials, will now be as consequential for US policy and the Northeast Asian region as was President Bush's decision to walk away from a working, successful multilateral deal supported by US allies in 2001. That decision was an unmitigated disaster for all parties, as was President Obama's embrace of its core principles in 2009. After Bush's decision to invade Iraq, his abandonment of US commitments and responsibilities in this region was the most costly US foreign policy blunder in decades. It is not a coincidence that broad international support for the P5+1 nuclear deal with Iran may not protect it, either, from Trump and congressional Republicans now.
If Trump's fear of talks with North Korea does not change, he will continue the misunderstanding of China's role that began with Bush and continues today in statements from US figures as diverse as top Senate Democrat Chuck Schumer and the anti-diplomacy Republican John Bolton. Both say China must force the DPRK back to talks. They seem unaware of the 15 year history of China's often patient reminders to US leaders that it is the US, not China, that holds the key to productive bargains with the North. The Chinese foreign ministry was explicit about this on Saturday.
Pulling the US away from South Korea
From what we are learning about chaos among the Trump group, the White House probably does not know that it is sliding inexorably toward military confrontation on Korea. Nor does it likely understand that with this decision it will continue the unfortunate separation of US administration interests from those of most South Koreans. Those who embrace the ideological, fearful and dependent view of South Korea's security, shared by Presidents Lee Myung Bak and Park Guen Hye, are a shrinking group. A majority is far more likely to support the next government's return to South-North discussions, and to economic and other interests that overlap. Such a development is quite possible, and would further complicate the US-Korea relationship.
We can hope that either the NSC after a rigorous policy review, or the State Department after taking over diplomatic tasks from the White House, will find new reasons and mechanisms (Track 2, Track 1.5, or even, boldly, Track 1) to engage with North Korean officials and learn their real views on a range of urgent issues. But that does not sound like the government we have. There may never be a good or politically safe time for the US administration to hold talks with North Korea. That is why these arms-length talks, now aborted, were probably the best channel to explore this key political and strategic territory under the new US administration.
Stephen Costello is a producer of AsiaEast, a web and broadcast-based policy roundtable focused on security, development and politics in Northeast Asia. He writes from Washington, D.C. He can be reached at scost55@gmail.com.
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Whose decision?
Among crucial and pertinent matters that bear on this story, the existence of an ongoing "review of Korea policy" within the NSC at the White House went unmentioned. On the day when front page stories in the New York Times and Post noted that the Secretary of State appeared to be sidelined, and was not consulted on major issues, Secretary Rex Tillerson's participation in Korea policy – or nonparticipation – was not addressed. Like the story of the death of Kim Jung Nam, this leaves the biggest questions unanswered. Much more needs to be known in order for it to be useful.
In this administration, at this time, it is hard to believe this was a low-level decision. Far more – or less – had to be going on among the Trump group in order to make this choice. Talks would have been specifically "Track 1.5" since US participants would not have been government officials. If the decision has been made to refuse unofficial talks – requiring the least political courage of all possibilities – then the biggest questions within the rumored "policy review" at the NSC have now been answered. After this snub by Trump officials, a tricky and difficult beginning has now been made all but impossible. All that's left for the NSC review to decide is whether to escalate military exercises, sanctions, or other coercive measures, or to pursue all three.
Critical timing
The timing of the proposed visit would have coincided with the beginning of US and ROK military exercises, designed to provoke insecurity in the North, among other things. That, in turn, provided a chance for both sides to make small, symbolic gestures to open space for dialogue. Such gestures could have included scaling back, moving or rebranding the exercises on the US and ROK side, and a degree of acceptance of some exercises on the DPRK side. Already, the US released a rare shipment of food to North Korea as one of the last acts of the Obama presidency, and it was noticed in Pyongyang.
It is not a surprise that the Trump administration has embraced the ‘fear of talks' with North Korea, which has helped destroy the possibility for denuclearization, greater economic development or tension reduction on the Korean Peninsula over the past 15 years. Republicans and ideologues who surround the White House are the least likely to notice the long list of opportunities that might open up if a US-DPRK contact were to resume. Still, many professionals, experienced former officials, and knowledgeable specialists have been imploring the new administration to at least listen to North Korean views and explore the possibilities.
Fateful decision
It may well be that the decision to refuse safe, unofficial talks, whether taken by President Trump or low-level officials, will now be as consequential for US policy and the Northeast Asian region as was President Bush's decision to walk away from a working, successful multilateral deal supported by US allies in 2001. That decision was an unmitigated disaster for all parties, as was President Obama's embrace of its core principles in 2009. After Bush's decision to invade Iraq, his abandonment of US commitments and responsibilities in this region was the most costly US foreign policy blunder in decades. It is not a coincidence that broad international support for the P5+1 nuclear deal with Iran may not protect it, either, from Trump and congressional Republicans now.
If Trump's fear of talks with North Korea does not change, he will continue the misunderstanding of China's role that began with Bush and continues today in statements from US figures as diverse as top Senate Democrat Chuck Schumer and the anti-diplomacy Republican John Bolton. Both say China must force the DPRK back to talks. They seem unaware of the 15 year history of China's often patient reminders to US leaders that it is the US, not China, that holds the key to productive bargains with the North. The Chinese foreign ministry was explicit about this on Saturday.
Pulling the US away from South Korea
From what we are learning about chaos among the Trump group, the White House probably does not know that it is sliding inexorably toward military confrontation on Korea. Nor does it likely understand that with this decision it will continue the unfortunate separation of US administration interests from those of most South Koreans. Those who embrace the ideological, fearful and dependent view of South Korea's security, shared by Presidents Lee Myung Bak and Park Guen Hye, are a shrinking group. A majority is far more likely to support the next government's return to South-North discussions, and to economic and other interests that overlap. Such a development is quite possible, and would further complicate the US-Korea relationship.
We can hope that either the NSC after a rigorous policy review, or the State Department after taking over diplomatic tasks from the White House, will find new reasons and mechanisms (Track 2, Track 1.5, or even, boldly, Track 1) to engage with North Korean officials and learn their real views on a range of urgent issues. But that does not sound like the government we have. There may never be a good or politically safe time for the US administration to hold talks with North Korea. That is why these arms-length talks, now aborted, were probably the best channel to explore this key political and strategic territory under the new US administration.
Stephen Costello is a producer of AsiaEast, a web and broadcast-based policy roundtable focused on security, development and politics in Northeast Asia. He writes from Washington, D.C. He can be reached at scost55@gmail.com.
