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A little more than a year ago, the prospect of war still hovered over the Korean Peninsula. North Korea had demonstrated the ability to strike anywhere within the continental United States with its November 2017 missile test, despite U.S. President Donald Trump only a month earlier warning North Korea, "Do not underestimate us. And do not try us."
As 2018 winds down, the situation on the peninsula is completely different. Talk of war has turned to talk of improving relations and whether North Korea will dismantle its nuclear weapons and missile programs.
For the moment it's difficult to imagine returning to the confrontation of 2017, but it's also unclear where the process with North Korea goes from here. The concerns of war may have ebbed, but diplomacy has only moved in fits and starts in 2018.
The sudden turn of events began with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's New Year address and acceptance of South Korean President Moon Jae-in's offer for North Korea to take part in the Winter Olympics in PyeongChang.
The success of North Korea's participation in the Winter Olympics helped lay the groundwork for the April inter-Korean summit in Panmunjeom, which itself helped set up the first U.S.-North Korea summit in Singapore.
While each of these meetings has produced new agreements, outside of a few areas such the inter-Korean military tension reduction measures and inter-Korean sports diplomacy, the progress has stalled of late. Talks between the United States and North Korea since the Singapore summit have not progressed.
The second summit between Trump and Kim that was originally expected to take place this past fall has been pushed to early next year. Stephen Biegun, the U.S. special representative for North Korea, has not had success in engaging his North Korean counterparts to make the progress that will be needed if this process is to be successful.
Trump may have ultimately withdrawn the United States from the Iran nuclear deal, but the type of intense discussions that led to that agreement has yet to materialize with North Korea.
After the Singapore summit, North Korea expected the United States to engage in a reciprocal process that would allow for sanctions relief. Instead, the United States has remained firm on its insistence that there will be no sanctions relief until North Korea has taken significant steps toward dismantling its nuclear weapons and missile programs.
Complicating matters, North Korea has yet to follow through on some of its commitments. Despite having pledged to allow inspectors to view the collapsed nuclear test tunnels at Punggye-ri and observe the dismantlement of its engine test site at Tongchang-ri, inspectors have yet to be allowed to confirm that these dismantlement steps have taken place.
The lack of progress on the U.S.-North Korea front has limited progress on the inter-Korean front. While the two Koreas have conducted a joint survey of North Korea's railways, sanctions continue to prevent more substantive progress from taking place.
While Trump has suggested he can be patient, if the situation with North Korea looks similar to today at this time next year, the United States and South Korea will be in a more difficult position. Another year with a lack of progress would provide North Korea with more time to reprocess spent fuel and continue to enrich uranium and expand its missile stockpile, all while running the risk of sanctions weakening over time.
If North Korea were to continue to refrain from taking provocative actions for another year, a sense of complacency could set in, as well as a sense that North Korea will remain a de facto nuclear weapons state.
If the United States and North Korea are unable to reach an agreement in 2019, it is difficult to imagine what might drive the process forward other than a sense on Trump's part that an agreement with North Korea would enhance his re-election chances. However, any agreement driven by political rather than security considerations is unlikely to be a good deal for the United States and South Korea.
The politics in the United States would also be difficult. In order to gain ratification of a treaty with North Korea in the Senate, Trump will need a strong and comprehensive deal with North Korea. Anything less would be unlikely to be ratified, and the odds will go down the closer the 2020 elections loom. With Republicans only holding a slim margin in the Senate, Trump will be unable to lean on Republicans to gain the 67 votes he will need.
By this time next year, we'll likely know if engagement with North Korea will be successful. The first indication of potential progress may come in Kim Jong-un's New Year address and whether a second summit early next year produces a vigorous series of negotiations. Otherwise, if there is another year without the type of intense discussion that led to the Iran deal, the process may stall for the foreseeable future and leave us in a worse place than we are now.
Troy Stangarone (ts@keia.org) is the senior director of congressional affairs and trade at the Korea Economic Institute.
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