[Korea Encounters] Trying to save a gov't from a coup in 1961

Military academy parade, published in The Korea Times May 19, 1961. / Korea Times Archive

By Matt VanVolkenburg

At 3 a.m. on May 16, 1961, tanks and trucks carrying around 4,000 marines and soldiers began rolling into Seoul. Other than some military police on the Hangang Bridge, no one opposed them, and by 5 a.m. key buildings had been secured and KBS was broadcasting their message to the country.

Tanks drive past the Bank of Korea, published in The Korea Times May 17, 1961. / Korea Times Archive

Two key figures of the military junta, Chang Do-young and Park Chung-hee, published in The Korea Times May 18, 1961. / Korea Times Archive

As The Korea Times reported, "Announcing the formation of a military revolutionary committee, the coup commanders proclaimed emergency martial law and declared take-over of all government powers ― administration, legislature and judiciary."

The committee's goals were to uphold "anti-communism as the first national policy," "observe the U.N. Charter," "strengthen friendly ties with free world countries," "eliminate all kinds of corruption" and "rectify a degraded national morale and spirit," "exert powers to achieve the nation's self-sufficient economy," "foster [military] strength," and "prepare itself for transfer of the political power to the fresh and conscientious politicians" with the promise that "when our tasks are fulfilled we will return to our original mission."

"Army chief of staff Lt. Gen. Chang Do-young was named as chairman" of the committee, but it quickly became apparent the real leader was Second ROK Army Deputy Commander Park Chung-hee.

Lt. Gen. Chang had not initially supported the coup. According to U.S. diplomatic cables, that morning at 3 a.m. he had alerted U.N. Commander Carter Magruder and asked him to commit U.S. MPs against the coup forces, but Magruder replied that he could not involve U.S. forces.

General Magruder is shown attending an archery contest, published in The Korea Times May 14, 1961. / Korea Times Archive

As the coup leaders ordered the arrests of government ministers, the whereabouts of Prime Minister Chang Myon, the country's leader under the Second Republic's parliamentary system, became the subject of much speculation. The Korea Times incorrectly reported that he "reportedly took refuge in American Embassy Compound One and moved to an unknown place."

President Yun Po-sun, a figurehead under the parliamentary system, was visited that afternoon by General Magruder and Marshall Green, charge d'affaires at the U.S. Embassy. That morning, both Green and Magruder had released statements showing "concern that legal and constitutional practices be observed," The Korea Times reported. "In this connection, General Magruder earlier in the morning said he is to support the―" Martial law censorship scratched out the rest of the sentence.

Censorship on an article titled "Position of U.S. Gov't Explained," published in The Korea Times May 17, 1961. / Korea Times Archive

As Green remembered it decades later, after being told of the coup by Magruder around 3 a.m., "I thought it would be very important that we, as soon as possible, make it publicly clear that the United States has nothing to do with this coup," and, "in fact, supports the duly constituted government." Magruder said he would think it over. He called hours later agreeing to make the statement after being contacted by First ROK Army (FROKA) commander General Lee Han-lim, who had urged him to speak out because the coup leaders were spreading rumors that the U.S. "was behind the coup…and that unless we made our position crystal clear, we would bear a responsibility through inaction in allowing the coup to consolidate its hold on the country."

Soldiers guard Sejongno, published in The Korea Times May 17, 1961.

For Green and Magruder, the coup, while shocking, was not entirely unexpected. In a letter written by Green's wife a month earlier, she had described "how there were rumblings in the night and there were demonstrations…and there was a sense of tension you could cut with a knife." Of Kim Jong-pil, considered by many to be the mastermind behind the coup, Magruder said he was "perhaps the foremost of the agitators whose elimination from the ROK Army I have sought over the past year." Kim had been removed in early 1961, but with the coup he was restored to his former rank.

In a May 17 report, Magruder added that he had made his statement "in order to help hold the First ROK Army in line and in an effort to stop all the neutrals from going over to the insurgents… This appears to have had some effect but it can not be expected to endure indefinitely." He added that "We are seeking to undermine the uprising by pressing the responsible commanders, from whose commands came the insurgent troops now in Seoul, to endeavor to get their troops to return to their duty," but had achieved only partial results.

During Magruder and Green's May 16 meeting with President Yun, Yun criticized the corruption and ineffectiveness of Chang Myon's government. To Magruder, he "appeared to consider a coup as an acceptable method of getting rid of his political opponent." He added that "Yun and Chairman of the House of Councillors George Paik oppose bringing in troops to suppress the uprising," as did ROK Army Chief of Staff Chang and the Minister of National Defense.

In Magruder's May 17 assessment, "all the powerful men in and around the Seoul government appear to have had knowledge of the plan for the coup and at least have not opposed it. The people appear to be divided for and against but they do not appear to be sufficiently concerned at this time to take any active part."

While most military formations appeared to be neutral at best, FROKA still seemed loyal, and with four divisions available to move on Seoul, Magruder assumed their numbers would force the coup leaders to surrender. Of Chang Myon, who contrary to news reports was not hiding at the U.S. embassy, Magruder wrote, "We urged to have him get in touch with us but he has not responded."

"If the Prime Minister will assert himself and direct the use of FROKA to suppress the uprising I propose to support him. Unless and until he does, I will seek to hold FROKA available for use. I do not know how long I can hold FROKA in this situation available to support Chang Myun by suppressing the uprising. The longer the Prime Minister remains in hiding the less are his chances of returning to power."

Magruder also added that, "A possible course of action is for me to direct Lee Han Lim to suppress the uprising," but since everyone with authority opposed this decision, and his mission was "to protect Korea from external aggression" and "internal subversion by the Communists," neither of which applied in this case, he dismissed this idea.

Korean Air Force Academy march, published in The Korea Times May 20, 1961. / Korea Times Archive

Green spent May 16 trying "to bring about some kind of solution that would retain the constitutional government," eventually convincing President Yun to try to reach a compromise with Chang Myon that might form the basis of negotiation with the coup leaders. Chang turned out to be hiding at a French-run nunnery and reached out to Green on May 17. He wanted the U.S. to intercede heavily on his behalf, but Green instead asked him to reach out to Yun, whom Chang remained suspicious of. Green reaffirmed to Chang that he stood "firm in support of his government," though it was becoming clear that "the Junta was beginning to assert control and hold over the country."

Prime Minister Chang Myun, published in The Korea Times May 19, 1961. / Korea Times Archive

Though Green and Magruder faced some criticism from the Pentagon and the U.S. press for their unilateral actions, the White House ultimately decided that their "statement went just about as far as you can possibly go without becoming seriously involved in the internal affairs of the ROK." Though they were given "wide latitude" to respond to the crisis by the State Department, with no Korean leaders willing to take effort to save the government, they were forced to slowly make an accommodation with the coup leaders. Green realized, however, that the principled position they had taken "was going to gain us some leverage" in "regard to the return to civilian rule."

Marine corps engage in roadwork, published in The Korea Times May 24, 1961. / Korea Times Archive

Amid the censorship, enforced austerity and arrests for everything from jaywalking to dancing that followed in the wake of the successful coup, Green learned from the CIA that his interference had made him a marked man, and spent weeks guarded at all times by 12 marines.

Though he was greeted coldly at his first meeting with Park Chung-hee in late May, in mid-July Park asked him to meet privately at a restaurant. Green was left baffled by Park's candor and sudden friendliness, but realized the now-ruling Park had come to respect him for the stand he had taken when Park said, "You made it so difficult for me to pull a coup d'etat in this country, that I don't think anybody will ever try it here again."

Sadly, this did not turn out to be true.

Matt VanVolkenburg has a master's degree in Korean studies from the University of Washington. He is the blogger behind populargusts.blogspot.kr.