By Cho Fiona Hye-min
On July 10, Kim Yo-jong, North Korea's deputy director of the United Front Department and younger sister of Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un, declared that North Korea will not denuclearize for the time being. She then qualified this statement by adding that denuclearization was a possibility in the future, just not possible "at this point in time." Kim's vague message echoes the stance that North Korea has presented for the past few decades, a wildly fluctuating series of concessions and retractions that has culminated in uncertainty over what to do about the nation's nuclear arsenal. In other words, the international community remains locked in a stalemate with North Korea over a conclusive deal regarding denuclearization.
To truly understand this current stalemate, it is imperative to examine the past history of negotiations. While it is true that North Korea first began to experiment with nuclear weapons in the 1950s, it was in the 1980s that its dealings first became an international issue. On Dec. 12, 1985, North Korea agreed to the terms of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). However, citing concerns regarding U.S. nuclear weapons positioned in South Korea, the regime refused to sign the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards agreement, a mandatory condition within the NPT.
What followed was the first significant series of negotiations with North Korea on nuclear weapons. Former U.S. President George H. W. Bush declared plans to withdraw all U.S. nuclear weapons positioned abroad, and then President Roh Tae-woo supported this action by declaring that South Korea will not store or possess nuclear weapons. The bilateral move worked ― Pyongyang, convinced by the promises, proceeded with the safeguards agreement with the IAEA and even collaborated with the South to sign the "South-North Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" in 1992. South Korea and the U.S. had reduced the number of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula, and North Korea had signed onto two major agreements dedicated to limiting nuclear weapons. It was a victory for non-proliferation.
While peaceful negotiation worked, officials had less success with aggressive bargaining and imposing sanctions. In 1994, when IAEA inspectors found evidence to suspect North Korea's duplicity in adhering to the terms of the NPT, they demanded that Pyongyang allow for special inspections to take place, which was followed by firm refusal in response. However, rather than initiating diplomatic negotiations to reach a compromise, the organization pushed back even harder and aggressively urged Kim's regime to permit the inspections. Had the IAEA reached out to North Korea in a less threatening, more diplomatic manner, Pyongyang might have chosen to comply, or at the bare minimum, offer a set of demands or a compromise. But instead, by applying pressure without carefully analyzing the reasons behind the regime's behavior and giving Pyongyang a chance to explain itself, the IAEA reversed the progress made with North Korea in the preceding years. North Korea would withdraw from the IAEA altogether a month later.
The reason why these historical events are key to understanding the current stalemate is because they provide three important lessons to handling this issue. Firstly, peaceful negotiations are key to continuing down the path to denuclearization. The reason is the success of past peaceful negotiations, which set a clear precedent for future such endeavors. For instance, in 1993, Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres successfully negotiated with Pyongyang in preventing the sale of missiles to Pakistan. The deal was almost sealed when the U.S. intervened, and discussions came to an abrupt halt. The diplomatic, non-threatening approach of the Israelis was able to secure progress, while the hostile, demanding attitude of the U.S. reversed whatever progress had been made.
Second, the events of the 1980s and 1990s suggest that sanctions should not be part of the solution. Rather than countering North Korea's power, sanctions are likely to expand its power by agitating the regime and causing it to test and develop more weapons in retaliation. Furthermore, sanctions provide North Korea with an excuse to not comply with the international community's demands. In 1998, Pyongyang famously declared that it would stop exporting missiles only if the U.S. made compensations for the financial damage caused by sanctions. Halting sanctions altogether will force North Korea to be unable to turn to such excuses and focus on discussing the more important issues.
Lastly, international leaders must build on the momentum created by successful negotiations. Far too many times have leaders hastily abandoned efforts to reduce North Korea's nuclear arsenal and reach a deal after gaining some momentum in previous discussions. Most notably, the Bill Clinton administration's attempts to reach a deal with the North and persuade it to sign the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines fell apart after the two countries' inability to compromise and the termination of Clinton's leadership. Because the subsequent Bush administration did not continue these discussions, what could have been successful negotiations were left in the dust. The same applies to the more recent series of summits between President Moon Jae-in, President Donald Trump, and Kim Jong-un. While there was some progress made, ultimately, the talks fell apart after none of the leaders were able to build on the momentum and actively push for more dialogue.
In summation, we must continue pursuing peaceful negotiations with North Korea, building on the momentum every time we make even a sliver of progress. We must also reject the possibility of using sanctions as a tool against North Korea and its development of nuclear weapons. That being said, there is still a need to be cautious. Given North Korea's track record, even though they may verbally express genuine intentions to cooperate with denuclearization efforts, they may break their promises or discreetly work on developing more nuclear weapons. The key here is to take small steps and practice patience. Denuclearization is a gradual, step-by-step process, and if North Korea ultimately takes more steps toward dismantling their nuclear arsenal compared to developing it, one day, it will eventually find itself on the doorstep of complete denuclearization.
Cho Fiona Hye-min is a student at Ewha Womans University.
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To truly understand this current stalemate, it is imperative to examine the past history of negotiations. While it is true that North Korea first began to experiment with nuclear weapons in the 1950s, it was in the 1980s that its dealings first became an international issue. On Dec. 12, 1985, North Korea agreed to the terms of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). However, citing concerns regarding U.S. nuclear weapons positioned in South Korea, the regime refused to sign the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards agreement, a mandatory condition within the NPT.
What followed was the first significant series of negotiations with North Korea on nuclear weapons. Former U.S. President George H. W. Bush declared plans to withdraw all U.S. nuclear weapons positioned abroad, and then President Roh Tae-woo supported this action by declaring that South Korea will not store or possess nuclear weapons. The bilateral move worked ― Pyongyang, convinced by the promises, proceeded with the safeguards agreement with the IAEA and even collaborated with the South to sign the "South-North Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" in 1992. South Korea and the U.S. had reduced the number of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula, and North Korea had signed onto two major agreements dedicated to limiting nuclear weapons. It was a victory for non-proliferation.
While peaceful negotiation worked, officials had less success with aggressive bargaining and imposing sanctions. In 1994, when IAEA inspectors found evidence to suspect North Korea's duplicity in adhering to the terms of the NPT, they demanded that Pyongyang allow for special inspections to take place, which was followed by firm refusal in response. However, rather than initiating diplomatic negotiations to reach a compromise, the organization pushed back even harder and aggressively urged Kim's regime to permit the inspections. Had the IAEA reached out to North Korea in a less threatening, more diplomatic manner, Pyongyang might have chosen to comply, or at the bare minimum, offer a set of demands or a compromise. But instead, by applying pressure without carefully analyzing the reasons behind the regime's behavior and giving Pyongyang a chance to explain itself, the IAEA reversed the progress made with North Korea in the preceding years. North Korea would withdraw from the IAEA altogether a month later.
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The reason why these historical events are key to understanding the current stalemate is because they provide three important lessons to handling this issue. Firstly, peaceful negotiations are key to continuing down the path to denuclearization. The reason is the success of past peaceful negotiations, which set a clear precedent for future such endeavors. For instance, in 1993, Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres successfully negotiated with Pyongyang in preventing the sale of missiles to Pakistan. The deal was almost sealed when the U.S. intervened, and discussions came to an abrupt halt. The diplomatic, non-threatening approach of the Israelis was able to secure progress, while the hostile, demanding attitude of the U.S. reversed whatever progress had been made.
Second, the events of the 1980s and 1990s suggest that sanctions should not be part of the solution. Rather than countering North Korea's power, sanctions are likely to expand its power by agitating the regime and causing it to test and develop more weapons in retaliation. Furthermore, sanctions provide North Korea with an excuse to not comply with the international community's demands. In 1998, Pyongyang famously declared that it would stop exporting missiles only if the U.S. made compensations for the financial damage caused by sanctions. Halting sanctions altogether will force North Korea to be unable to turn to such excuses and focus on discussing the more important issues.
Lastly, international leaders must build on the momentum created by successful negotiations. Far too many times have leaders hastily abandoned efforts to reduce North Korea's nuclear arsenal and reach a deal after gaining some momentum in previous discussions. Most notably, the Bill Clinton administration's attempts to reach a deal with the North and persuade it to sign the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines fell apart after the two countries' inability to compromise and the termination of Clinton's leadership. Because the subsequent Bush administration did not continue these discussions, what could have been successful negotiations were left in the dust. The same applies to the more recent series of summits between President Moon Jae-in, President Donald Trump, and Kim Jong-un. While there was some progress made, ultimately, the talks fell apart after none of the leaders were able to build on the momentum and actively push for more dialogue.
In summation, we must continue pursuing peaceful negotiations with North Korea, building on the momentum every time we make even a sliver of progress. We must also reject the possibility of using sanctions as a tool against North Korea and its development of nuclear weapons. That being said, there is still a need to be cautious. Given North Korea's track record, even though they may verbally express genuine intentions to cooperate with denuclearization efforts, they may break their promises or discreetly work on developing more nuclear weapons. The key here is to take small steps and practice patience. Denuclearization is a gradual, step-by-step process, and if North Korea ultimately takes more steps toward dismantling their nuclear arsenal compared to developing it, one day, it will eventually find itself on the doorstep of complete denuclearization.
Cho Fiona Hye-min is a student at Ewha Womans University.
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